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Man and the natural world
Paul W. Taylor’s concept of species egalitarianism
1. Biocentric turn
Ethical reflection on the envi-
ronment appears to be a necessary 
element in deliberation on the world 
in which we live. The progressive 
degradation of the natural 
environment gives rise to a question about the origin of this process and 
ways of constraining it. Environmental ethics, which is a sphere of such 
special consideration, already today contains some theoretical positions 
offering different diagnoses and remedies for the widespread ecological 
crisis. Next to anthropocentrism, non-anthropocentrism-”sentientism,” 
ecocentrism, ecofeminism and deep ecology, significant debates are also 
conducted within the domain of the so-called biocentrism. This trend 
holds that unfavourable changes can be hindered by adopting a different 
outlook on the world. One needs to realise that it is not only the human 
being that stands at the centre of the existing world, but that every being 
with its intrinsic dynamic process of life is of inherent worth. Thus, 
biocentrism is essentially opposed to anthropocentrism (man’s central 
standing in the world) and to some extent to non-anthropocentrism-
”sentientism” (central standing of sentient creatures). Philosophy regards 
the following figures as the major originators of this extended outlook 
on the natural world: Albert Schweitzer, Kenneth Goodpaster, Robin 
Rev. Grzegorz Hołub – a doctor with a ha-
bilitation degree, a philosopher, an asso-
ciate professor at the Faculty of Philosophy, 
the Pontifical University of John Paul II in 
Kraków. He specialises in bioethics and an-
thropological philosophy.
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Attfield and Paul W. Taylor.1 In the Polish philosophical reflection this 
position is represented by Zdzisława Piątek.
The present paper shall focus its analysis only on Paul Taylor’s views, 
and to be precise - on his concept of biocentric egalitarianism (species 
egalitarianism). The concept is a project to which the author devoted 
a lot of his energies and coverage, and which appears to be controversial. 
Thus, it provokes analysis and consideration, and eventually leads 
to a statement as to the degree of its plausibility. Taylor presented the 
concept by advancing four theses, which here will become the focus of 
consideration. We will trace their significance, their interrelationships, 
and take a critical look at them, providing a positive proposal to solve 
the emerging dilemmas.
To begin with, we should precisely define the ethical profile of Paul 
Taylor’s deliberation. His type of reflection results in going beyond the 
confines of traditional ethics, which is essentially related to human 
individuals and interhuman relations within the Homo sapiens 
community. This turn follows from the fact that the American thinker 
can discern the necessity to include the nonhuman world in ethical 
reflection. This necessity is already indicated in Taylor’s definition 
of environmental ethics, which he called reflection on “the moral 
relationship that hold between humans and the natural world.”2 In view 
of the foregoing, one might say that the philosopher originated a new 
type of philosophical consideration, in which moral relevance arises 
from a different understanding of the phenomenon of life. It is a type 
of ethics for a bio-community, where man is only one of the species, 
and where the greatest emphasis is laid on the phenomenon of life of all 
wildlife.
 1 See J. B. Callicott, Environmental Ethics, [in:] Encyclopedia of Bioethics, ed. S. G. 
Post, vol. 2, New York 2003, p. 760.
 2 P. W. Taylor, Respect for Nature. A Theory of Environmental Ethics, Princeton 1986, 
p. 3.
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2. The theses of species egalitarianism
In his book entitled Respect for Nature. A Theory of Environmental 
Ethics Paul Taylor proposes four major theses concerned with the status 
of living beings and the relations between them. The theses are as follows:
(1)  Humans are members of the Earth’s Community of Life in the 
same sense and on the same terms in which other living things 
are members of that Community.
(2) The human species, along with all other species, are integral 
elements in a system of interdependence. The survival of each 
living thing, as wet as its chances of faring well or poorly, 
is determined not only by the physical conditions of its 
environment but also by its relations to other living things.
(3)  All organisms are teleological centres of life in the sense that 
each is a unique individual pursuing its own good in its own 
way.
(4)  Humans are not inherently superior to other living things.3
Taylor elaborated proper significance for these theses. And so it is 
necessary to take a close look at the author’s intentions, as well as to 
follow through the main aspects that the philosopher discerned and 
developed within the theses, which he also termed beliefs. Here it is 
also important to emphasise a vital premise accepted by Taylor. He 
analyses the status of beings and their interrelations, taking into account 
the things they have in common. With regard to human beings, he is 
convinced that we are members of a biological species, which determines 
the basic characteristic of our being. Hence, even though he recognises 
the existing differences between man and the rest of nature, he is not 
interested in them; in a way he leaves them aside.4
 3 Cf. ibidem, pp. 99–100. Earlier, the author propounded these theses in the paper: 
The Ethics of Respect for Nature, „Environmental Ethics”, vol. 3, 1981, pp. 197–218.
 4 See P. W. Taylor, Respect for Nature…, op. cit., p. 101.
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2.1. Man as a citizen of the earth’s community of life
Under the first thesis Taylor enumerates five different aspects. The 
first one refers to biological and physical requirements for existence and 
survival, which man shared with other creatures of the natural world. All 
creatures inhabiting our planet depend on the relations with the natural 
environment for their existence. This dependence has a crucial bearing 
on the development of further properties, which means that many 
further features of a given form of life cannot emerge unless there are 
proper physical and biological conditions present in the environment. 
Taylor writes in regard to man that “survival itself and at least a certain 
minimum level of health and strength are necessary conditions for 
pursuit of other human values.”5
The other aspect of this proposition points to a given being’s own 
good. Every being - both human and nonhuman - has a good of its own, 
the realisation of which depends on the determinants which we cannot 
always control. As he speaks about a given being’s own good, Taylor 
means the good related to its life and development, regardless of relations 
with other beings. He points out that “if we can say […] that something 
is good for a given entity or bad for it, without reference to any other 
entity, then the entity has a good of its own.”6 Realisation of such a good, 
even in the case of man, is not completely dependent on his efforts. 
The philosopher points out that denying this truth is a manifestation 
of arrogance and man’s illusory superiority, and the effects of this self-
delusion bring about negative experiences in our lives.7
The third aspect of the first thesis is concerned with free will, autonomy 
and social freedom. In their fundamental dimension they apply to man 
only. Only man is capable of making choices between different options, 
being guided by his own rational cognition. Besides, only man can set 
himself goals to attain and thus shape his future. Finally, only man can 
 5 Ibidem, p. 103.
 6 Ibidem, p. 61.
 7 See ibidem, p. 104.
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enjoy the so-called social or political freedom. The point here is about the 
possibility of influencing social and political structures that define the 
living conditions for an individual. But in Taylor’s opinion there is another 
dimension, the fourth one, which can be plausibly related to all beings in 
the earth’s community of life. The philosopher defines it thus: “For being 
free in this sense is being able to preserve one’s existence and further one’s 
good, and being unfree in this sense is being unable to do these things.”8
This perception of freedom, as Taylor claims, is akin to the concept 
of an “absence of constraint.” The point here is about independence of 
various types of constraint. The philosopher points to the following kinds: 
inner and outer constraints; active and passive constraints. The outer 
constraint is usually connected with circumstances or factors external 
to an entity. The inner types of constraint are stimuli or states to be 
found inside an entity. Active types of constraint are connected with the 
operation of some factor; the passive ones imply an absence of something 
necessary – being devoid of something. And so Taylor formulates the 
following pairs of various kinds of dependence: (a) outer active – e.g. 
a closed door, a barbed wire barrier, physical violence or torture; (b) 
inner active – obsessive-compulsive thoughts and uncontrollable desires, 
extreme physiological needs, e.g. food, sleep; (c) outer passive – a lack 
of money, food, potable water, or medical care; (d) inner passive – a lack 
of knowledge, professional qualifications, ill health, physical and mental 
handicap.9 
This type of freedom primarily refers to human entities. However, 
Taylor claims that this type of thinking can also be related to animals and 
plants. Every time an organism – either a sensitive or a vegetative one – is 
capable of realising its own good in its own specific way (realisation of 
biological functions), we can say that it is free. Taylor openly states:
an organism may be said to be free if it has the ability and opportunity to pro-
mote and protect its good according to the laws of its nature. To the extent that there 
 8 Ibidem, p. 106.
 9 Ibidem, p. 107n.
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are constraints that make it difficult or impossible for an organism to realize its 
good, to that extent it is unfree.10
The types of compulsion that can be distinguished in nonhuman 
beings are connected with impediments to the realisation of their own 
food because of some environmental conditions, a lack of appropriate 
means to promote and protect their own good, health anomalies, or 
a lack of normal properties, e.g. an acquired vision defect.11
In animals, the most easily recognisable symptom of a lack of freedom 
is restricted freedom of movement resulting from being kept in a cage, 
a trap or on a chain. Regaining freedom will thus consist in removing 
such restrictions. In plants – as Taylor observes – one can also point to 
symptoms of compulsion, and by extension to ways of becoming free 
from them. An example of compulsion on a plant (a tree, a bush) can 
be a lack of space for unrestricted growth, when its roots are crammed 
into a container that is not big enough. Moving a plant to the natural 
environment will serve as a kind of liberation, restoring its freedom.
The above analyses address some basic kind of freedom. It applies to 
both humans, animals and plants. This freedom, as the absence of positive 
and negative constraints, is an instrumental good for all beings. Thanks 
to it, every creature can realise its basic good, which is a free expression of 
its existence. And as Taylor observes in this context, “to be free is to have 
a better chance to live the best kind of life we are capable of.”12
The fourth aspect of the first thesis refers to the shared origin of man 
and other species inhabiting the Earth. Taylor points out that Homo 
sapiens individuals emerged as a result of the operative mechanism of 
evolution, natural selection and genetic inheritance, just like any other 
living organism. He even observes that man is a relative “latecomer” and 
that his emergence was preceded by other species which had constructed 
networks of mutual relations and interaction. On the basis of estimated 
 10 Ibidem, p. 109.
 11 See ibidem.
 12 Ibidem, p. 111.
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data, Taylor writes that man appeared on Earth between 400,000 and 
500,000 years ago. Compared with the geological age of the Earth, such 
a time-frame is relatively short.
The system thanks to which made it possible for man to appear on 
Earth had been in place much longer. And it was only thanks to its 
efficient operation that it was possible for human beings to emerge. As 
he takes such a view of the matter, Taylor has no choice but to conclude 
that “we no longer see ourselves as special objects of creation. We are 
the product of a system that has produced every other kind of living 
being.”13 The point here is of course the process of evolution. Its “factors 
that governed our original emergence were not different from those that 
gave rise to all other creatures.”14 The claim that the emergence of man 
was the culmination of the process of evolution is – according to the 
philosopher – an indication of man’s vanity.
The fifth aspect of Taylor’s first thesis is about pointing to man’s 
dependence on the Earth’s ecological system and to the fact that man’s 
presence in it is not necessary. The philosopher points out that humans 
are totally dependent on the condition of the natural environment for 
their existence, which cannot be demonstrated in reverse. The “health” 
and harmony of the earth’s biosphere is not dependent on man in the 
slightest degree. Only man is incapable of existence and self-protection 
without help from the natural order of nature. As far as this order 
remains intact, at least in its foundations, human beings can exist and 
develop freely. As Taylor writes: “our dependence on the general integrity 
of the whole realm of life is absolute.”15 And so radical and unfavourable 
changes to the environment pose a serious threat to the survival of the 
human species.
This cannot be said of the reverse relation. The crisis of human 
creatures which would result in their slow extinction or even complete 
disappearance should not have a negative effect on the biosphere. With its 
 13 Ibidem, p. 112.
 14 Ibidem.
 15 Ibidem, p. 114.
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natural systems, the Earth will continue existing unless the disappearance 
of the Homo sapiens individuals amounts to the annihilation of the 
natural world (e.g. as a result of nuclear war). However, in a different 
situation, e.g. as a result of the extinction of Homo sapiens caused by 
typically human disease, the environment will continue to exist. But 
that’s not all, the natural world might actually even benefit from the 
disappearance of man. The earth’s community of life, as a whole, will 
benefit from the absence of the human being. Here Taylor mentions the 
cessation of the destruction of natural habitats which has been taking 
place wherever new housing estates, factories and airports are built.
The departure of man from this world would also mean the end of the 
degradation of the natural environment resulting from the widespread 
use of contemporary technologies, uncontrolled birth rate or excessive 
consumption. The philosopher directly points to the beneficial effects 
of man’s absence from Earth: the ecosystems will recover the balance, 
tropical forests will regain their beneficial effect on the planet’s climate, 
the polluted seas and oceans will become liberated from noxious 
substances in several centuries’ time. Volcanic eruptions and periods of 
glaciation will be the only factors that might upset the environmental 
harmony. Taylor is convinced that the Earth’s community of life, now 
free from man, will regain its vitality and developmental dynamics. He 
states the following:
The final disappearance of Homo sapiens, then, not only would the Earth’s Com-
munity of Life continue to exist but in all probability its well-being would be enhan-
ced. Our presence, in short, is not needed.16
2.2. The human species in the network of interdependence
Taylor’s second thesis addresses the question of interdependence 
between the organisms belonging to the earth’s community of life. It 
is about the connections and relations between both individuals and 
 16 Ibidem, p. 114n.
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species. The whole natural world is characterised by a rich complexity 
of mutual relations, relationships and references. Thus arises a certain, 
complex network of ecosystems. As Taylor observes:
all the different ecosystems that make up the earth’s biosphere fit together in 
such a way that when one is radically or totally destroyed, an adjustment takes place 
in others and the whole structure undergoes a certain shift.17
This shows that no ecosystem or its constitutive living creatures can 
be regarded in isolation from other elements of this type. No one of them 
is an isolated whole. That which occurs in one ecosystem has an effect 
on another one. Taylor calls this complex whole the “natural world.”18
This proposition carries implications for the human being. Like 
any other living creature, man is a part of the earth’s community of life. 
In its existence and development, it is dependent on other beings and 
ecosystems. Therefore, man cannot destroy or radically weaken them, 
because in doing that he reduces his chances of survival and realisation 
of the uniquely human values. 
However, Taylor is not in favour of a holistic or organicist ethic. He 
does not want to say that the interrelationships between organisms and 
ecosystems constitute some quasi-organism and that some specific moral 
norms follow from its workings. Because in a case like this the norm 
of moral conduct would be defined from the viewpoint of the whole: 
its good, vitality and dynamism. Although he can discern the extensive 
network of interrelationships, Taylor is in favour of singling out the value 
of each individual being as a separate good. It is only this particular 
being that delineates (engenders) rights: the right for its expression and 
realisation, and the resultant obligations - the obligation to preserve and 
promote the good, which is binding upon those who are aware of it.19
 17 Ibidem, p. 117.
 18 Ibidem.
 19 See ibidem, p. 118.
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2.3. Organisms as teleological centres of life
Taylor’s third thesis points out the fact that all living things are 
teleological centres of life. Each one is an entity striving to realise its 
own inherent good. His cognitive approach is realised in certain stages.
The philosopher first points out that becoming cognisant of the 
structure of organisms enables better understanding of their life and 
development, in accordance with the laws of a given species, but also 
of their effect on other living things. Then comes the knowledge of 
these living organisms as sui generis beings, as certain individua. In this 
context Taylor mentions work done by scientists who, as they study living 
organisms, can discern their uniqueness: “close observation [of them] 
over an extended period of time, whether in the laboratory or in the 
field, has led them [the experimenters] to an appreciation of the unique 
«personalities» of their subjects.”20
And that is no privilege reserved for scientists. Taylor is of the opinion 
that every nature lover can discover this individuality of plants and 
animals. Communing with a living thing for some time, coupled with 
careful observation, lets one form an opinion that its manner of living 
is unique. Taylor is convinced that such an observer can even become 
involved in a given being’s fate, its good and bad fortunes. He claims that
The organism comes to mean something to one as a unique, irreplaceable indi-
vidual. Finally one achieves a genuine understanding of its point of view. One can 
then imaginatively place oneself in the organism’s situation and look at the world 
from its standpoint.21
This transition from the objective knowledge of an entity to the 
recognition of its individuality and eventually to the realisation of its 
viewpoint is – in Taylor’s opinion – an approach to that which we call the 
cognition of an individual living entity.
 20 Ibidem, p. 120.
 21 Ibidem.
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Thanks to it we learn what it means to approach a given organism 
as a teleological centre of life which strives to preserve itself and realise 
its own good in its own peculiar way.22 As regards a given entity the 
striving does not have to be conscious. Both plants and animals remain 
teleological centres of life, even if they do not realise this and do not take 
any intentional actions aimed at achieving their goals. Taylor adds that:
all organisms, whether conscious or not, are teleological centers of life in the 
sense that each is a unified, coherently ordered system of goal-oriented activities 
that has a constant tendency to protect and maintain the organism’s existence.23
The individual viewpoint, which is connected with the unique 
“personhood” of a plant or animal, is determined by a one-of-a-kind 
way in which they respond to environmental stimuli, interact with other 
organisms, and in which they undergo changes determined by cycles 
of life and development of a given species. Man can come to know 
this individual viewpoint of a plant or an animal, when he looks at 
these beings in an objective way, that is while suspending his feelings, 
intentions or interests. Besides, this will be possible once the human 
entity embraces some viewing integrity. The point is to become detached 
from the particular aspects in which plants and animals usually appear 
to man on account of their usefulness or functions in human activity 
(the way a hunter views a pheasant may serve here as an example of 
this single-aspect mode of viewing). It is about a positive perception of 
nonhuman beings as multi-faceted creatures which lead their own kind of 
existence, responding in their own unique way to specific environmental 
circumstances that they have to deal with.24
 22 See ibidem, p. 120n.
 23 Ibidem, p. 122.
 24 Taylor writes: “Insofar as we are able to achieve wholeness of vision in our grasp 
of an organism’s uniqueness, we come to know the life of that individual as it is lived by 
it. We then conceive of it as a complete, many-faceted being carrying out its own mode 
of existence, responding in its own way to the particular circumstances confronting it” 
(ibidem, p. 127).
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This kind of change in human attitudes serves to extend the human 
consciousness. It is about this moment when man can develop in himself 
greater sensitivity to the world of nonhuman beings. As Taylor claims, 
as he acquires the capacity to adopt the viewpoint peculiar to other 
creatures, he is in a position to make a judgement based on their own 
good. Taylor writes:
Seeing them as we see ourselves, we are ready to place the same value on their 
existence as we do on our own. If we regard ourselves as possessing inherent worth, 
so will we be disposed to regard them.25
2.4. Man as an equal to other beings
Taylor’s last thesis challenges man’s superiority over other beings. 
The philosopher is convinced that if we have accepted the previous 
propositions, then we should be inclined to accept this last one. Still, 
he makes a further attempt at demonstrating the legitimacy of this 
conviction.
Taylor observes that the assertion about man’s superiority over other 
living entities results from the conviction that he possesses certain 
properties that they do not possess. However, the problem he discerns 
here is that an argument like this can be turned against man. He does not 
possess that which nonhuman beings possess, or he does possess that 
but in a much more limited scope. A possible solution to the problem is 
the proposition that the characteristics possessed by man are of greater 
value than those found in plants and animals. Rationality, aesthetic 
creativity, individual autonomy, free will may be recognised as uniquely 
human properties testifying to his superiority. But the philosopher asks: 
to whom and on what grounds are these characteristics valuable? There 
is no doubt that their significance is assessed from the human viewpoint, 
in the context of human life and fulfilment. But when man adopts the 
 25 Ibidem, p. 128.
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above-mentioned attitude, that is he views plants or animals from their 
viewpoint, he is likely to arrive at completely different conclusions.26 
This look at nonhuman beings from their own viewpoint reveals 
that the only reliable method of assessment is to refrain from using 
human values as the measure. It is necessary to employ values that are 
appropriate for them, their species and their fulfilment. Hence, the good 
that is appropriate for, say, a family of chimpanzees delineates the criteria 
for assessing a member of this group. The degree to which a given entity 
realises this good determines the degree to which it can be considered 
better or worse than another entity in the same species. Taylor says that 
a given being may be assessed as superior to another one provided that 
both fall under the same assessment standard.27 Plants and animals 
cannot be regarded as inferior to humans if they do not fulfil that which 
humans do. The goals pursued by human beings are not the ones that 
other beings set out to pursue.
In the philosopher’s opinion, the intellect that human entities possess 
cannot be the characteristic that tips the scales of value in their favour. 
Man needs intellectual powers in order to realise his human good and 
pursue his human goals. Thus, it is the property without which he could 
not be himself. This, however, cannot be said of other beings, sensitive 
or vegetative ones. For they realise their own good and pursue their own 
goals: they do not need the intellect for their existential fulfilment.28 
As Taylor observes: “that the realisation of the Human Good requires 
a proper use of reason in the guidance of life tells us nothing about the 
worth of the lives of those living things whose end is not the Human 
Good.”29 The philosopher makes an attempt at subverting the conviction 
 26 See ibidem, p. 130.
 27 See ibidem, p. 131.
 28 However, even the absence of active powers of reasoning does not mean that these 
beings do not act rationally. Through observation we know that the functions they per-
form (e.g. eating, defence or reproduction) are in a way rational and belong to some ra-
tional order which is knowable and the operative principles of which can be established. 
Thus, rational tendencies are in a way intrinsic to the life of animals.
 29 P. W. Taylor, Respect for Nature…, op. cit., p. 137.
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firmly embedded in the European philosophy, whereby rational beings 
fulfil a special function. He states the following: “we must realize that 
rationality is but one capacity of a certain class of living things which 
depend on exercising it for their well-being.”30
Taylor is consistent in propounding the thesis about species equality, 
which is of fundamental significance for his concept. Both plants and 
animals and humans have the same inherent worth. On the strength of 
this, we people have the same prima facie obligations towards them as 
well as towards other people. The good of plants and animals must be 
taken into account as seriously as the good of Homo sapiens entities. 
Thus, the philosopher formulates the principle of species-impartiality, 
as he asserts the following: every species that inhabits the Earth is of 
equal worth, has the good equal to others, and that good enforces on the 
agent an equal degree of commitment. The good of individual beings 
should be preserved and safeguarded as an end in itself. All beings have 
equal inherent good and hence no good can be assessed as superior or 
inferior.31
3. A critical look at the theses of species egalitarianism
The above-presented views by Paul Taylor touch on the essential 
issues concerned with the outlook on the surrounding world. And so 
they merit careful consideration, at least in several crucial aspects. This 
need for reflection also results from the very character of the theses that 
constitute his biocentric view. They give rise to controversy, thereby 
provoking profound consideration. Therefore, on the one hand one can 
discern in them questionable propositions that require critical viewing. 
On the other hand, the theses indicate presence of some crucial premises 
that need to be accepted whenever integral reflection on man and his 
place in the natural world is undertaken.
 30 Ibidem, p. 138.
 31 See ibidem, p. 155.
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Beginning with the latter view, it needs to be stated that the human 
being has a lot in common with the environment, which has its 
resonance in the thought of the philosopher in question. Indeed, man 
can be recognised as a member of one of the species inhabiting the Earth. 
Among the living beings, he appears as one of the biological organisms, 
even though – and this needs to be emphasised – he is something more 
than just a biological organism. The environmental conditions in which 
the human entity functions are common to all existing organisms. Man 
undergoes similar stages of being born, growing and passing away; he is 
subject to manifold disease and other environmental determinants, just 
like animals. Hence, saying that the human being is a certain kind of an 
animal is in a way legitimate.32
Also, the statement that the human species lives in a certain relationship 
with not only the environment sensu largo, but with specific plant and 
animal species is self-evident. Man not only simply needs specific living 
beings for his survival, as a source of food, but also many a time benefits 
from that which other species contribute to the natural environment. His 
life’s chances of auspicious development are greater when the harmony 
with other species is not upset, or when he can eliminate or rectify the 
abnormalities that creep in.
The thesis that every organism is a teleological centre of life, which 
strives to realise its own good understood as a goal does not seem to stir 
up controversy either. A biologist is likely to agree with that, stating that 
all organisms, as they are members of specific species, have their own 
stages of development and it is a matter of the natural course of things 
that they attain them (allowing for some occasional anomalies), which, 
for instance, can be helpful when determining their age. A philosopher 
too will agree that a given being strives after its goal (telos) and the goal 
is a certain good (i.e. fulfilment of existence). Such an equation of good 
 32 This proposition is likely to be accepted by biologists, but also by philosophers, be-
ginning with Aristotle. As regards the contemporary version of the Aristotelian thought, 
the thesis about man as an animal is espoused by Patrick Lee. A chapter in one of his books 
is entitled: “Human Beings Are Animals.” See P. Lee, R. P. George, Body-Self Dualism on 
Contemporary Ethics and Politics, New York 2008, pp. 4–49.
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and a goal can be found in Aristotle.33 This goal-good, although defined 
in its essence by the dynamics of a given species, comes to be concretised 
in a given individual. It strives after its own fulfilment and many a time it 
does it in a unique way. This slight specificity as to tendencies across all 
species is discernible and so one can find that every entity in one way or 
another displays individual features.
However, Taylor’s theses may raise some serious doubts too. These 
actually arise with the fourth thesis. The philosopher states that typically 
human characteristics cannot serve as the measure with which to 
determine the value of nonhuman beings. Such beings must be assessed 
according to their own categories. Neither the human-specific rationality 
or autonomy, nor aesthetic creativity or free will can lead us to the 
conclusion that the fact that animals or plants do not possess them makes 
their axiological status inferior. With regard to the inner aspect, which 
has been presented so far, this seems legitimate. Every being has its own 
telos which determines what is required to fulfil it. One might say that 
the measure of a given being’s value is the way it strives after its own 
good and how it fulfils it, and not the way it looks in the light of another 
being’s telos.
However, rigorous compliance with this requirement demands that 
one refrains making any comparisons between different living beings. 
The point is not only about giving up judgements whereby man is 
someone superior to and better than animals or plants, or vice versa, 
which in effect means giving up any positive-negative interspecies 
judgements. It would also be necessary to give up passing any evaluative 
judgement. But Taylor does pass a judgement like this. In his conclusion, 
the philosopher formulates the principle of species equality, that is he 
points to the necessity to recognise that all species are of equal value.34 
 33 Aristotle addresses good as a goal in the context of human action (see Arystoteles, 
Etyka nikomachejska, trans. D. Gromska, Warszawa 2000, no.1094A), but it seems that 
this in general can be related to natural becoming as well.
 34 Paul Taylor’s deliberations might lead to different conclusions. In substantiating his 
theses, he pointed to the weaknesses of Homo sapiens: they appeared late in the world, 
dominated other species and are engaged in destruction of the biosphere; their departure 
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This is a position of axiological egalitarianism. From it, Taylor even 
derives a peculiar imperative determining the necessity to become 
involved in the protection and promotion of every type of being in an 
impartial manner.
The consistent thing to do would be to refrain from expressing an 
evaluative thesis which goes beyond members of the same species. One 
might at most say that one chimpanzee is more perfect than another 
chimpanzee, because it realises the goal-good of this species in a better 
way. But one should not compare the chimpanzee to the human. And 
so one cannot say whether it is better, worse or equal in value to man. 
It would be best to say that it is different. And that is the conclusion 
presented by David Schmidtz as he comments on Paul Taylor’s theses. 
He claims that the first three are acceptable, but the fourth one is not. 
Recognising that we are members of the Earth’s community of life, which 
is about an extensive network of relationships with other beings, and that 
we are teleological centres of life does not necessarily have to lead to the 
conclusion about being equal to the whole biosphere. Supporting the 
thesis about equality is not the only way to have respect for other beings. 
Recognising them as different beings who have their own telos and good 
is enough to take actions concerned with care and respect for them.35
Another accusation that can be levelled at Taylor’s theses is the 
emerging incommensurableness of the particular theses. The last one, 
which concerns species equality, is clearly of a total character: it expresses 
a conviction about the status of all species. However, that which leads to 
the thesis, i.e. the relevant premises, has been derived by way of selective 
choice. On the one hand, Taylor clearly relegates to the background some 
important aspects of man’s free and rational action. On the other hand, he 
demands that we take an integral look at plants and animals, recognising 
will have a healing effect on the Earth’s community of life. From this it follows that it 
is better to recognise human beings as a suspicious species and not grant them a status 
equal to that of other beings. From this perspective, man can be simply recognised as a 
worse part of the natural environment.
 35 See D. Schmidtz, Are All Species Equal?, [in:] Environmental Ethics. What really 
Matters, What really Works, ed. D. Schmidtz, E. Willott, New York 2002, p. 96n.
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them as multi-faceted beings (the third thesis). The philosopher takes this 
measure to emphasise only those characteristics that we have in common 
with animals and plants.36 It is a form of partial reductionism (in relation 
to some section of beings - Homo sapiens beings) and apparently it has 
been performed purposefully. One might therefore ask if such a selective 
presentation of the human being justifies drawing such a far-reaching 
conclusion. For it seems that the premises underlying the last proposition 
were deliberately devised, which means that already at the starting point 
the philosopher might have known the ultimate conclusion.
It is in this context that Schimdtz accuses Taylor of unjustified 
minimalism and a selective approach to the premises in formulating the 
theses concerned with the biocentric position. Schmidtz claims that it 
is an illegitimate move whereby firstly the characteristics common to 
all living beings are enumerated; and then propounded is the thesis that 
it is only them that are of moral significance; and finally it is stated that 
on account of this all living beings are equal with regard to their worth. 
There may also be other characteristics which are possessed by only 
some beings and which determine their different axiological status.37 
That is the case of the human being. That which Taylor reduced – in 
the aspect of the higher functions of human freedom, rationality and 
aesthetic creativity – may be the thing that in fact justifies man’s different 
axiological status.
4. Towards axiological pluralism
How could one come to know this dissimilar axiological status and 
reveal it? Well, it seems justified to presuppose that this dissimilarity in 
the goods possessed is something internally conditioned. It results from 
 36 Taylor straightforwardly states: “We do not deny the differences between ourselves 
and other species […], we keep in the forefront of our consciousness the characteris-
tics we share with all forms of life on Earth” (P. W. Taylor, Respect for Nature…, op. cit., 
p. 101).
 37 See D. Schmidtz, Are All Species…, op. cit., p. 98.
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the inherence of some inner ontic value in every animate being.38 So 
as to avoid the naturalist error, it is right to accept that the value is not 
a natural quality or anything derived from it.39 The one accompanies 
the other, but recognising their presence is essentially a matter of two 
different types of predication. Cognition of natural states is usually about 
acquiring some information; cognition of values is about noticing the 
importance of a given being. As regards this, personalists claim that 
acquiring cognition of a given thing in the empirico-informational 
aspect always involves noticing its axiological status.40 It is cognitive-
emotional states that inform the cognition-acquiring agent about that. 
As we become cognisant of something, we always form an opinion (as 
a set of information) as well as an emotional reference to the thing, some 
kind of an emotional attitude. To us, the thing always acquires some 
meaning, becomes revealed as some importance (of one or another kind, 
greater or lesser). More often than not, the way this happens is that the 
more thoroughly one explores a given thing in the empirical aspect, the 
more the relevant value becomes revealed to our intuition. As we gather 
information about something, we acquire the feeling of its significance 
and import.
This is particularly important with regard to plants, animals, and 
especially humans. These beings never appear to us as pure states 
of affairs or sets of information. We always approach them as certain 
good-values, and even though this approach accompanies empirical 
cognition, it is never its derivative: it appears as if incidentally to the 
process of information gathering. The attitude concerned with the feeling 
 38 See W. Galewicz, O dobru drzew i ekologicznej reformie utylitaryzmu, [in:] 
Świadomość środowiska, ed. W. Galewicz, Kraków 2006, p. 41.
 39 It is not certain whether Taylor would presuppose that. His deliberations about 
the inherent value come very close to pronouncements on natural characteristics: hav-
ing some inherent value on account of belonging to the biotic community of the natural 
ecosystem. See P. W. Taylor, Respect for Nature…, op. cit., p. 78n. There would be no nat-
uralist error here, if it was demonstrated that the biotic community of the natural eco-
system is characterised by good in itself, and is not just some factuality, or a natural state.
 40 See J. Merecki, Naturalizm etyczny. Błąd naturalistyczny, [in:] Powszechna encyklo-
pedia filozofii, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, vol. 7, Lublin 2006, kol. 531n.
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of importance is “constructed” in us in parallel, in a different sphere of 
cognition-experience.
Next, it needs to be admitted that if living beings appear as certain 
values, then these axiological states require adequate explanation, or 
providing some rationale. In other words, if it is striking that living beings 
appear as certain goods, then there must be some kind of explanation for 
this experience. For instance, in regard to the human being, personalists 
are likely to say the rationale for axiological experience can be furnished 
by anthropological reflection. As Tadeusz Styczeń writes: “anthropology 
[...] provides the rationale but no premises for ethical theses, for the 
ethical theses are the premise behind it [...], while it is the conclusion.”41 
In “reductive logic” – propounded by this philosopher – the starting 
point is an experience of man’s special value, which though surprising 
(and in practice burdensome by “appealing” for a change in conduct) 
necessitates some explanation. Though given, it is not self-explanatory. 
Thus, naturally it provokes quest for the rationale.
If [...] the rationale - adds Styczeń - proves to be “human nature,” then its accep-
tance is above all a matter of accepting that which can solely and ultimately explain, 
or to put it differently, consistentise the fact of its content that the experience of 
morality informs us about.42
As it addresses the issue of human nature, the concept of man gives 
rise to the possibility of providing a rational explanation for apparent 
valuableness of man. There seem to be good reasons to pronounce on 
plants and animals likewise: their good-value may find its ultimate 
consistentisation in the structure of their being, even though – like in 
the case of man – this value is neither derived nor deduced therefrom: it 
is given in direct experience.
The axiological experiences concerned with the existence of plants, 
animals or human beings should actually themselves convey to us which 
 41 T. Styczeń, Antropologia a etyka, [in:] idem, W drodze do etyki, Lublin 1984, p. 126.
 42 Ibidem.
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being is more perfect. In most cases that is what happens; people are 
usually quite firmly convinced that the values become arranged in the 
following hierarchy: first a human being, second an animal, and then 
a plant. This hierarchy, which results from an intuitive reading of the 
essence of every being, can then be explained away (consistentised by 
way of providing ultimate reasons) by referring to the nature of plants, 
animals and finally human beings.
It may also happen that this axiological reception is not clear, or even 
disrupted for some reasons.43 Thus, there can even arise some dispute 
whether in reality – say – the human being is more valuable than the 
chimpanzee. On the plane of the reception of the good-value, this dispute 
may be irresolvable. The parties to the dispute will declare disparate 
axiological experiences. The only way to eliminate the disparity will be 
to say that either of the parties to the dispute has wrongly recognised 
a value, and so what we are dealing here with is an axiological illusion or 
even axiological blindness. However, such an approach is unsatisfactory. 
There is little that it resolves as it points to the cognitive and emotional 
immaturity of either of the parties (though asserting that someone is 
wrong is legitimate).
It is necessary to resolve the dispute by having recourse to the 
arguments substantiating one thesis or another about a good-value. Even 
though arguments themselves do not reveal axiological experiences, 
they can serve to prove that such and such an experience is true. A false 
experience (resulting from an axiological illusion) will be lacking 
in proper ultimate arguments. There will be nothing justifying it or 
justifying it adequately. Moreover, it is easier to conduct a confrontation 
between the arguments (by determining their strength) than between 
axiological experiences. Arguments can be cognitively analysed so that 
they can be divided into better and worse ones, appropriate and illusive 
 43 The reasons may be cultural (absolutisation of evolutionary thinking and the re-
sultant conclusions) or concerned with the outlook on the world (religious or quasi-re-
ligious convictions about the equality of animals), which result in the “blurring” of the 
axiological hierarchy.
152 Grzegorz Hołub
ones. Given this perspective, it appears that an intersubjectively reliable 
debate might be possible.
The settlement of the dispute – say between naturalists and 
personalists – over who is more valuable, the human or the chimpanzee 
can thus be effected not on the plane of comparison and confrontation 
of relevant axiological experiences, but by undertaking an analysis of 
their (man’s and chimpanzee’s) natures and of the arguments thus 
obtained. These arguments will become a form of verification of the 
conflicting experiences. They will reveal which ones are adequate, and 
which ones are not. Unlike the first type of cognition, which was related 
to conflicting axiological experiences, looking for arguments must be 
systematic and thorough. One should avoid making presuppositions or 
provisional reductions which might narrow the field of cognition in an 
a priori manner, which is the case of Paul Taylor.
Referring to the integral structure of specific (plant, animal and 
human) beings, therefore, affords a chance to justify the varied axiological 
status and formulate appropriate rights and obligations. That is a method 
that can prove to be very useful in making the transition from the 
position of axiological egalitarianism of the biosphere to the position of 
axiological pluralism, which more accurately renders the wealth of the 
world we live in.
Abstract
The paper takes up Paul W. Taylor’s theses (beliefs) concerning the relations between 
human beings and the environment. First thesis sets forth that humans are members of 
the Earth community of life; second, humans are interrelated with other species; third, 
all organisms are teleological centers of life tending to fulfill their inner good; fourth, hu-
mans are equal with other living creatures. These theses are analyzed in-depth and criti-
cally assessed. Most controversial is the last belief. It implies that all living creatures have 
the same value and should be treated equally. The paper shows that these assertions are 
not viable. More realistic is the idea that natural living creatures differ as far as their val-
ues are concerned. Hence, in the paper is undertaken an attempt to figure out a method 
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of disclosing these axiological differences, starting from a personalist model describing 
mutual relations between anthropology and ethics.
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